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ROUND TABLE

A RADIO DISCUSSION OF

IE WAR: Two Years of History

GON BALDWIN · AVERY O. CRAVEN · PETER F. DRUCKER

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NOTE

The supplementary information contained in the footnotes to the following text, developed by staff research, is not to be considered as representing the opinions of the ROUND TABLE *speakers. Following the transcript of the broadcast are questions which readers may wish to use for analysis and discussion. It is hoped that teachers and discussion leaders may find this additional service of the* ROUND TABLE *transcript helpful in their study of the subject discussed in the broadcast.*

THE WAR

Two Years of History

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST*

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HANSON BALDWIN, Military Analyst, *New York Times*

AVERY O. CRAVEN, Professor of American History, University of Chicago

PETER F. DRUCKER, Lecturer and Professor of Economics, Sarah Lawrence College

* A radio discussion broadcast from Radio City, New York, over the Red Network of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, August 31, 1941, at 2:30 P.M., Eastern Daylight Saving Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without a script. Subjects are chosen because of their social, political, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the selection of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by participants who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company.

THE WAR

Two Years of History

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On September 1, 1939, while the German "Luftwaffe" droned eastward toward Poland, Adolf Hitler told the German people that the Reich had been forced to the use of arms by the encirclement policy of Britain and her Allies.

Events since that day have become history—not too clearly written in the headlines of the world's newspapers. Great battles have been fought on land, in the air, and on the sea. It has been difficult to gain historical perspective upon events which strike at the bases of traditional diplomacy, economics, and military practice.

What has happened to the world during the last two years? What lessons have been taught in the fields of politics, economics, and military theory? How will these lessons affect the future of America and of the world?

To analyze outstanding aspects of two years of the second World War, and to answer some of the questions events of this period have raised, the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE *invited three experienced observers to its microphone to discuss: "The War—Two Years of History."*

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MR. CRAVEN: Two years ago the eyes of the world were on the Polish cavalry, tilting their lances against the armored tanks of Germany. Today, the war has become a battle for the world.

Those two years have been marked by a series of revolutions in

almost every field of human endeavor; and revolution is the key to the meaning of these years. How does that hold for the military side, Baldwin?

MR. BALDWIN: It is unquestionably true.

I want to emphasize first that anything I say today represents only my own personal opinion.

Tactically and technically the science of war has undergone a revolution as profoundly important in the military sphere as the Industrial Revolution was in the economic sphere.

MR. CRAVEN: What do you think of that, Drucker?

MR. DRUCKER: I think that in economics we have seen a complete and revolutionary change. The war economy of today is something so new that it is going to affect all our lives in any postwar system.

The very fact that today you need between 20 and 30 men behind front lines to keep one man equipped and fed and clothed and fighting means that today you cannot adapt a peace economy to war uses. You must have a war economy which has its own institutions. You must choose between airplanes and automobiles, if not between guns and butter.[1]

And if you fool yourself and try to do business as usual in a modern war, you'll be licked, and licked very speedily.

MR. CRAVEN: And, of course, in a conflict between the totalitarian ideals and the democratic ideals, there is a profound political conflict, with a revolution at its base.

I would like to have you enlarge on your understanding of the military revolutions involved, Baldwin.

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[1] *For a discussion of the impact of the war upon national economies, see the* ROUND TABLE *discussions "Guns or Butter?", "Defense Economics," and "The Effect of the Blitzkrieg on the Economic Order"* *listed on page 27.*

MR. BALDWIN: In other words, you want me to hold the microphone spotlight for a moment, do you?

MR. CRAVEN: That's exactly what I mean.

MR. BALDWIN: It is a little difficult in a short space to cover the scope of two years of warfare, but obviously there are major lessons on land, in the air, and at sea. Obviously, the internal combustion engine—and by that I mean the gasoline engine and the Diesel engine in the tank and in the plane—has revolutionized the art of war.

MR. CRAVEN: The Industrial Revolution has at last caught up with warfare?

MR. BALDWIN: Unquestionably it has.

MR. DRUCKER: And do you mean that the old sources of power in warfare, the foot soldier, gunfire, the battleship, have become obsolete, as some military men seem to think?

MR. BALDWIN: Not at all; but in their old forms they have become obsolete. The armored man, covered with parapets of steel, is absolutely essential to the modern battlefield. The battleship with anti-aircraft guns that can fight off the dive-bombers is essential to the modern navy. And without any doubt mechanization, in the sense that the Germans have used it in Europe, is essential to the conduct of war. The Germans, for instance, have some 260 divisions, of which some 20 to 30 are armored divisions.

MR. DRUCKER: So you would say, Baldwin, that the old concept of war—one which was fought over strategic borders and against fortified positions, and so on—is gone, because the airplane can fly over a border and can fly over a fortress and reduce it from the air.

MR. BALDWIN: Yes. I should say that the war of maneuver, the war of mobility, has replaced the trench stalemate of the first



World War. As you all know, for the last 20 years the Germans sought the answer to the machine-gun-held line, and they found that answer in the tank on the ground and in the plane in the air.

MR. CRAVEN: If I remember correctly, Baldwin, men said, in studying the last World War, that we had only picked up where the American Civil War had left off and that Grant and Lee, in the closing part of our Civil War campaigns, had, in reality, begun the tactics and the strategy which were to last through the first World War.

MR. BALDWIN: That is quite true. In the trenches outside of Cold Harbor, perhaps, was born the slaughter of the World War says; and in the modern war, the war of peoples, which is necessitated by the voracious demands of the mechanized divisions, the armored man is absolutely an essential ingredient of warfare.

MR. DRUCKER: And would you also say, Baldwin, that the

warplane has overcome that oldest and strongest of old military means, the navy?

MR. BALDWIN: No, I would not say that it has overcome the navy. I would say that it has profoundly altered the tactics of sea-power; that in its most profound sense it has made the necessity of secure bases for sea-power more important than ever before in history.

England, in one sense, is no longer on an island; strategically she is still part of the continent of Europe, for the plane has leaped the narrow seas.

MR. CRAVEN: And I would think, if that is correct, that it means a shift of sea-power, from Great Britain to America, which by its very position with the Atlantic and Pacific on either side has that security of base.

MR. BALDWIN: Without any question I think the center of gravity of world sea-power is shifting to the United States. And, without any question, I think there are three major military lessons to be learned from the wars of today. First, that it no longer suffices to have half-trained armies of foot troops in the old sense—the modern war machine is so complex that soldiers must be thoroughly trained over long periods of time. Second, that sea-power must have secure bases—bases which are no longer available on the continent of Europe. Third, that the strategic frontiers of the past no longer exist in the old sense.

MR. DRUCKER: All that sums up that today you have a situation in which you have one continent pitted against the other, in which you have the continent of Europe, in essence, pitted against the continent of America, militarily. Wouldn't you say so?

MR. BALDWIN: In effect, yes. One other point which is of fundamental importance to the social history of the future is that

there is no longer any "behind the lines." The home front is as important as the military front; and the civilian has become a soldier. I think that that factor, that bombs dropped from the air can reach the very nexus of our civilization, has changed profoundly the whole meaning of life.

MR. DRUCKER: You know, Baldwin, I want to take my cue from what you said about the civilian being the soldier, that there are no civilians. That is precisely the basic fact in the economic changes: the fact that today you need 20 to 30 workers who do not fight for every fighting man. That means you must have a war economy in which every man, practically, is working for defense and for fighting rather than for civilian consumption.

MR. CRAVEN: Are you saying that you have two distinct economies, a war economy and a peace economy; and that the two of them do not blend, nor can one be superimposed upon the other?

MR. DRUCKER: Yes, Craven, I say precisely that. I think there is no more dangerous illusion today than the Chamberlain illusion that you just make a few changes in your economy in order to fight a war. I think a war economy is something which is different from the ground up.

MR. BALDWIN: In other words, you are saying this is a war of machines, not only machines on the battlefield but machines behind the lines?

MR. DRUCKER: Yes, I think that machines on the battlefield without machines behind the lines are completely useless, and vice versa, so that today you must have what you have in Germany, where every single man is, in effect, in the army.

MR. CRAVEN: And you are also saying, if I understand you, that the American notion of "business as usual" does not go with the winning of wars.

MR. DRUCKER: You know, that wasn't really an American notion. Actually this country developed a modern war economy in 1917. The notion of business as usual was an English notion, the notion that you can win the war by having money in the till was a Chamberlain illusion, and it came pretty near to losing the war for England.

MR. BALDWIN: I'd like to have you go into that a little farther. It seems to me that you are in sort of the position of the Negro preacher who was waited on by his congregation which objected a little bit to his sermons. They went up to him and said, "Well, suh, you argufies, and you preachifies, but you don't specify." I'd like to have Drucker specify a little farther on that statement.

MR. DRUCKER: In one of your articles, Baldwin, you mentioned the fact that the Germans have only 25 mechanized divisions, not because they believe that 25 are enough, but because of the limitations of their productive capacity. And yet Germany has 60 per cent, or nearly two-thirds, of her productive capacity, of her manpower, of her plants, of her raw materials, working day and night for war production. So, while you couldn't very well have more than two-thirds and still keep the civilians reasonably well fed and reasonably well clothed and housed, the Germans do not consider even that enough. In England, too, you have two-thirds of the national productive capacity engaged in war production.

MR. CRAVEN: Have you any figures for the United States on the percentage of our production that goes into our armament program?

MR. DRUCKER: I wouldn't dare to guess. The picture is too complex. The goal of the present defense program is one-third of the total national productive capacity diverted to war uses. That would give us about the same production of war material as the

PROFITS: EFFECTS OF THE WAR

Per Cent Increase in Profits: 1941 Compared with 1940

[FIRST SIX MONTHS]



Average Rate of Profits: 1941 [FIRST SIX MONTHS]



EACH COMPLETE SYMBOL EQUALS 5 PER CENT

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* *Survey by National City Bank, New York.*

Germans have with two-thirds, simply because this country has at least double the productive capacity of Germany.

MR. BALDWIN: There are other important points which you haven't mentioned, and those are the question of rationing and the question of so-called "substitutes."

MR. DRUCKER: Oh, yes! I think a future University of Chicago ROUND TABLE is going to discuss precisely those questions. I don't think you can understand how important rationing, or the direction of civilian consumption, is until you realize that to divert one-third of the total man-power, of the total plant capacity, and of the total raw materials into war use is absolutely the same as to divert one-third of man-power and plant capacity and raw materials to idleness, as we did between 1929 and 1932. You'd have a situation in which there would be sacrifices all around.

MR. BALDWIN: An integral part of this economic revolution, which in turn is a part of the wider world revolution of which we have been speaking, is, of course, the German attempt to attain autarky, or a self-sufficient continent, isn't it?

MR. DRUCKER: Yes, I think that goes far beyond the limits of economics. That goes right to the heart of the political and military problem. The Germans are attempting, and are having quite a bit of success in their attempt, to create a self-sufficient European Continent which would be absolutely secure against economic attack and blockade.

MR. CRAVEN: Wouldn't you go farther and say that as far as German war aims are concerned they are primarily political and that your military and economic action has been primarily for political purposes?

MR. DRUCKER: Yes. It is one of the essential points of the totalitarian creed that the army and the economic machine are just tools for political ends.

MR. CRAVEN: And don't you think that fact is one of the great lessons the two years of war have taught?

MR. DRUCKER: One of the most important aspects of the present situation has been summed up by a Nazi writer who said that, in the modern world, war and peace are no longer two different things but are just two different tools, as different as a hammer and a chisel, and you use each of them for a specific purpose; but they have no intrinsic, no inherent, difference.

MR. CRAVEN: The revolutions you have pointed out in the military and in the economic world are very interesting. But what, definitely, can we say about the present-day situation? What, as far as the winning or losing of the war is concerned, from the military angle, would you say, Baldwin?

MR. BALDWIN: It depends, of course, on just what you mean by "winning the war." When the war started, unquestionably a part of the British war aims, it seems to me, was to prevent any one power from assuming complete dominance over the continent of Europe.

MR. CRAVEN: It seems to me that the American people are not very clear in their thinking about the actual gains and losses up to date. We are not certain whether or not England is in a bad way and in danger of losing the war, nor are we certain just how far Germany has been successful in her aims.

MR. DRUCKER: You might say that in two years of the war every belligerent has completely revised his concept of what the war is aimed at, except Hitler. He has known from the beginning what he wants, and he has been trying hard to get it.

MR. BALDWIN: I think that is a very good point. I think that you can say this with fairness, and I'd like to know whether you agree with me: In so far as Britain's attempt to prevent German

domination of the Continent is concerned, she has failed to prevent that domination. Obviously, we have only to look at the list of conquests—Poland in 18 days; France in some 39 days; and the rest of them—and at Germany advancing steadily farther and farther eastward into Russia to see that England has failed to prevent German conquest of the continent of Europe.

MR. DRUCKER: I am not so sure that I fully agree with you in your statement of English war aims.

I remember when I was in England during the Munich crisis a very definite split of opinion existed as to whether a war should be waged for the freedom of the Continent or for the preservation of Britain's command of the sea and for the British Empire. Now, haven't we still got that basic split in all our minds?

MR. BALDWIN: You took me up a little too sharply, Drucker. I didn't mean to indicate that Britain's only war aim was to prevent the domination of the continent of Europe. I think that is one of the aims. I think there were a good many other war aims, among them the preservation of the British Empire and continuation of British domination of the seas. In the latter two she is still successful.

MR. CRAVEN: But the fact remains that Hitler has been successful.

MR. BALDWIN: There is no doubt of that.

MR. CRAVEN: He has achieved his great aims as far as the European Continent is concerned.

MR. BALDWIN: Not completely. I would add one qualifying factor: That the Russian armies are still in being and still fighting.

MR. CRAVEN: That would imply, then, that the whole difference between victory and defeat, as far as we stand at the end of our two years, depends upon the Russian Army?

EMPLOYMENT: EFFECTS OF THE WAR

Total Nonagricultural Workers



EACH COMPLETE SYMBOL EQUALS 5,000,000 WORKERS

MR. BALDWIN: Precisely. I think they hold the key to the military situation today.

MR. DRUCKER: Well, I would like to qualify your pessimistic outlook by saying that, after all, up until the moment Hitler attacked Russia he didn't have to fight a war. He got all he wanted by simply picking it up.

MR. CRAVEN: You mean by that, that in the other countries he occupied he really found the door opened from the inside.

MR. BALDWIN: By fifth columnists.

MR. DRUCKER: Not only that. More important even than fifth columnists, he did not run into a real willingness to resist Naziism. There was a very substantial amount of public opinion in France and Belgium and Holland and Norway and Czechoslovakia which believed that even Hitler was better than war.

MR. CRAVEN: Now he must batter down his doors from the outside.

MR. DRUCKER: He has only got one open door left. That is Turkey, in the Near East, where Hitler can still march in with his Nazi legions without running into a people willing and equipped to fight.

MR. BALDWIN: For the last two years we have seen a war being waged for the continent of Europe . . . .

MR. DRUCKER: And being waged largely as a war of nerves rather than as a military war.

MR. BALDWIN: I wouldn't agree wholly with that, by any means. I think there have been a great many military victories won in this war. But up until now the action has been confined, and to win further victories Germany must now burst beyond the bounds of the Continent.


DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET ENTERPRISES AND PRODUCTION
Number of Enterprises
WEST OF URALS
URALS AND SIBERIA
COAL
IRON AND STEEL
Value of Production
WEST OF URALS
URALS AND SIBERIA
COAL
IRON AND STEEL
·HAYDON·
EACH COMPLETE SYMBOL EQUALS 10 PER CENT OF TOTAL NUMBER OF ENTERPRISES OR OF TOTAL VALUE OF PRODUCTION
COMPILED FROM ECONOMIC DATA CONTAINED IN "BOLSHOI SOVIETSKII ATLAS MIRA," VOL. I

MR. CRAVEN: And she must cross water for the first time.

MR. BALDWIN: Not for the first time.

MR. DRUCKER: No. There was Crete.

MR. BALDWIN: We have left out of that picture, explicitly, the situation in Russia. I always add that in.

MR. DRUCKER: We hear so much about Russia being able to continue resistance even if the Germans should push the Russian armies a thousand miles farther back, to the Urals. Now, I happen to know Russia a little bit, not well, but I don't think there are any important industries east of the Don-Volga Line, which is only 400 miles from where the Germans stand.[2] How are the Russians going to fight on if they should be forced back beyond that line?

MR. CRAVEN: You are suggesting that if the Russians lose their present industrial centers, they will have nothing to fall back on, and the German problem is primarily one of conquering those industrial centers which seemingly lie within reach at the present time?

MR. DRUCKER: Yes. I would like to know what Baldwin thinks of that.

MR. BALDWIN: I'd like to offer three points. First, I think that Hitler has lost the battle of time in Russia. I think without any question the Germans counted on winning a rather definitive victory before snow flies. It now appears that they will not win that victory and there will be a winter campaign.

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[2] *The* ROUND TABLE *transcript "Soviet Russia at War," listed on page 27, contains an economic atlas of the western portion of the U.S.S.R. published for the first time in America.*

During the last decade increasing emphasis on decentralization of industry has relieved Soviet dependence upon Ukrainian industry. It is estimated that evacuated labor from the Ukraine steel industries will permit fulfilment in other areas of the scheduled increase in 1941 steel production of 3,300,000 tons—an amount equal to the production of Krivoi Rog, major steel center lost to Germany. Two iron and steel mills are nearing completion in the Urals. In all, 1,576 new industrial enterprises are scheduled for completion in 1941, most of them East of the Don-Volga Line, and many of them in the Kuzbass, industrial center of Siberia. *(See illustration page 15.)*

But, nevertheless, I agree with Drucker that if the Germans get the Leningrad-Moscow and Ukraine industrial areas, it will be impossible for the Russians, in a conventional sense, to support an army of anywhere near their present size.

There is just one other point before I am interrupted. (I see people eager to interrupt on both sides of me.) I think we must look back to Munich for a parallel of what might happen in Russia. As you well remember, Munich gained time for the British; yet it sacrificed some 30 Czech divisions. If we can conceive that by next spring Hitler wipes out 200 to 300 Russian divisions, the time gained in the process by the democracies cannot possibly compensate for the loss of those divisions, because neither England nor the United States can supply 200 to 300 divisions in the meantime.

MR. CRAVEN: You remind me of the story of the old man who asked for a history of the world in ten volumes. And when the ten volumes were completed and they brought them to him, he said he did not have time to read them, would they reduce it to one volume. They reduced it at last to one volume, and then when he was brought the one volume, the time was so short he said they must have it reduced to one page. They reduced it to one page. By that time it was so late he said, "You must reduce it to one word"; and as the old man passed away, his informer leaned over him and whispered the one word for human history—"If."

MR. DRUCKER: Well, that is perfectly true, and that applies to all such speculations as are habitually indulged in every Sunday on this University of Chicago ROUND TABLE. I think Baldwin has brought up a very important point, namely, What has Hitler gained by gaining material possession of the Continent?

MR. CRAVEN: Yes. Has he not, to a certain extent, annexed revolutions, or potential revolutions, by his conquest?

MR. BALDWIN: He has certainly annexed headaches; of that there is no doubt.

MR. DRUCKER: He has annexed sabotage, but the doubt in my mind is whether the sabotage will amount to much; whether it can really slow down the German war machine effectively, unless you have an invasion from outside the Continent. Can you have a revolt without an invasion?

MR. BALDWIN: That is a difficult question to answer. I think, without any question, air-power has made revolt in the old sense impossible. We have only to look at Poland (where the Germans have been using air-power as a police weapon) to see that a few planes rather than a great army can now police a tremendous extent of territory. I think that economic sabotage, rather than actual revolt, is now possible, and a very important weapon if coupled with military victories.

MR. DRUCKER: We have quite forgotten what is perhaps the most important change in the war. Two years ago everybody thought that the center of power in this world was the French Army, with its reputation for invincibility. Today, we all know that the center of power is in the steel mills of Pittsburgh and Cleveland and Chicago. In other words, we know that the center of gravity, militarily and economically, is in this country.

MR. CRAVEN: As far as that goes, I think you are merely raising the question of what all this means to the American people. You have painted a very dark picture. You have pictured the European victory practically in Hitler's hands. You have pictured Russia as a thin line, holding out, with not even great possibilities there. What does that mean as far as the United States is concerned? First of all, I would say that all of these defeats and Hitler's victories have brought a great change in American thinking. Two years ago we were of the opinion that the war belonged to Europe. We were sick of our participation in the last war. We felt that we had to pay for it. We felt that we had fought for democracy and all we got was ashes in our hands.

The result has been that only reluctantly we changed our position in the face of these victories until I should say today we are largely composed of interventionists and noninterventionists.

MR. DRUCKER: But there are no isolationists in the traditional, literal sense of the word?

MR. CRAVEN: They have passed out of the picture to a large extent.

MR. BALDWIN: By that you mean all of us recognize that the war must have some effect upon this country, regardless of what alternative there is to offer.

MR. CRAVEN: And it has had very decided effects. The American people have not only changed their attitudes, but I am quite of the opinion that never before have we analyzed our democracy with such intensity—perhaps not since 1860. The fact that Hitler says democracies are not efficient, that we cannot reach our ends, may have brought us to the point of where we have had to answer whether or not democracies can efficiently function in the modern world. And while there is a good deal of disputing of points, nevertheless we are beginning to feel that our democracy can succeed, and that with a certain unity that is possible our democracy may play its part.

MR. BALDWIN: I don't think there should ever have been any doubt of that question.

MR. DRUCKER: I think there has been a dangerous tendency to believe that bayonets are a more effective means to create unity than an appeal to fundamental beliefs.

MR. BALDWIN: In effect you are saying that there has been a difference of opinion and a lack of unity in this country.

MR. CRAVEN: There has been a difference of opinion—no question about it at all; but there has been a basic unity in the United States that we have sometimes ignored.

It seems to me that we have agreed that the situation in Europe is not one to inspire confidence, as far as Britain and her cause is concerned; that a new military order has come, which rests on machines and trained men, with arsenals of organized economic effort behind the lines.

War must be won by fighting and sacrifice and sweat and blood; by united concentration on production; and by action for military ends which have become political ends.

The United States, whether we like it or not, is in the center of these changes, if not in the war itself. We have certainly found that as far as war is concerned (during these two years) neither war nor preparation for war is the same as it was in 1917–1920. Perhaps, also, we have begun to suspect that when peace comes we may find a world as different in ways economic and political as warfare itself has become different.

SUGGESTED READINGS

ABEL, DERYCK, "Economic Causes of the War," *The Contemporary Review*, June, 1941. *The author finds that the "insane warfare" of economic nationalism was the basic cause of World War II.*

ATTWATER, DONALD, "The 'War' behind the War," *Commonweal*, July 25, 1941. *Beneath the conflict between "totalitarianism" and "democracy" lies the struggle between Christianity and false humanist views of life.*

BALDWIN, HANSON W., "Military Lessons of the War," *Yale Review*, June, 1941. *A discussion of the military revolution in methods and mechanics of war.*

CHAMBERLIN, WILLIAM HENRY, "The Struggle for Continents," *Atlantic*, September, 1941. *An observer of Soviet affairs feels that the present Russo-German war definitely eliminates Stalinite communism as Europe's "wave of the future."*

FODOR, M. W., "The Revolution Is On," *The Annals*, July, 1941. *The conclusion is reached that the present stage of the world revolution is counterrevolution (National Socialism), but that this cannot be regarded as its final form. The July, 1941, issue of "The Annals" is devoted to problems raised by the present international situation.*

KERNAN, W. F., "Defense Myth," *Harper's*, August, 1941. *Grand strategy in warfare went to sleep in the shadow cast by the myth of sea-power according to this army man.*

MILLER, DOUGLAS, "What It Costs Hitler," *Atlantic*, September, 1941. *A summary of Germany's losses and gains in men, material, and morale after two years of war.*

MUNK, FRANK, *The Economics of Force.* New York: Geo. W. Stewart, 1940. *A detailed analysis and definition of the economy of force and a discussion of the problems of democracies isolated in a sea of totalitarianism.*

NIEBUHR, REINHOLD, "New Allies, Old Issues," *Nation*, July 19, 1941. *The present world conflict has led to more than ordinary confusion about problems of principle and strategy due to the peculiar character of the political systems engaged in it.*

PULESTON, WILLIAM D., "What Are the Chances?" *Atlantic*, August, 1941. *A comparison of the German and British military position after two years of war, with a brief glance at the role the United States is playing.*

ROBINSON, G. T., "Three Invaders of Russia: Napoleon, Wilhelm, Hitler," *New Republic*, July 21, 1941. *In the past coalitions have destroyed conquerors, but the political tripartite division of the world may prevent a coalition today.*

"This War Is No Joke," *Collier's*, June 21, 1941. *We cannot do an adequate job for Britain and ourselves and still have business as usual.*

UTLEY, FREDA, "Can Democracy Survive Total War?" *The Annals*, July, 1941. *We must start thinking about what we mean by "democracy" and attempt to solve the problem of how to control the unlimited state.*

WALKER, BASIL C., "America's Destiny," *Current History*, June, 1941. *This writer believes that the American epoch is dawning and that the burden of world leadership rests on us.*

OBJECTIVE QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINATION

The answers to the following questions may be found in the text of the broadcast, and page references are provided to assist in locating the answers.

*

1. How many men are needed behind the lines to feed and equip a soldier at the front? Page 3.
2. What does the phrase "mechanized warfare" mean? What is the proportion of armored divisions to the total number of divisions in the German army? Page 4.
3. What are the present-day military answers to trench warfare? Are there any "front lines" today? Pages 4–5.
4. The tactics of sea-power have been altered in what fashion by the introduction of the warplane? Has sea-power been superseded by air-power? Page 6.
5. In the opinion of Mr. Baldwin, what are the three military lessons to be learned from the present war? Page 6.
6. What distinguishes a war economy from a peace economy according to Mr. Drucker? Page 7.
7. Each of the following countries has what per cent of its total production devoted to war materials: Germany? Great Britain? The United States? Page 8.
8. What is meant by the word "autarky"? How does a nation achieve this objective? Page 10.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on pages 21–22.

*

1. Do you believe that the present war is the result of a world revolution? Discuss the statement that the military revolution is a complement of the Industrial Revolution.
2. With the aid of the suggested readings, discuss the major military, economic, and political lessons of the war today.
3. Why is the present war called a war of the peoples? What is meant by the phrase "There are no more civilians today" when applied to a nation at war.
4. Is it possible for any great power in the world to follow a policy of welfare economy if any other great power follows a policy of power economy?
5. Discuss the implications of the statement that the army and the economic machine of a nation are merely political tools.
6. Evaluate the losses and gains of the belligerents during the past two years. What are the war aims of the British and the Germans? How does the United States figure in this world picture?
7. It has been suggested that Russia is the key to the present military situation. What is her role and what are her chances?
8. Is revolt of the conquered peoples against their conquerors possible today? What are the possibilities for economic sabotage?
9. What meaning has the last two years of warfare for the American people? Discuss.

The Listeners' Round Table . . . .

Letters to the ROUND TABLE *frequently contain interesting and illuminating sidelights on the subject matter discussed on the air. These comments are from letters received following the broadcast discussion of "Weapons of Economic War," August 24, 1941.*

*

Anyone Want Tungsten?

This is not only a fan letter, it's a plea for help—business guidance. The ROUND TABLE is a great institution; it is of considerable influence because it does a great deal of "uncovering." To the differing extents of our mental ability, we see, we glimpse, or we miss entirely the larger things and the forces moving them. The thoughts and information coming from this central point undoubtedly inspire considerable action—some of which reflects back into the hands of the ROUND TABLE—as in this case. Next comes the query, Does the Table pass on information, factual and otherwise, to the best possible points?

If so, here is a fact. . . . . I am manufacturing tungsten compounds. That is, reducing the ordinary ore concentrates to the oxide form and to the pure metal 99 per cent to 99.9 per cent pure. I am doing this at Bishop, California, one of the most important tungsten centers in America. I am at present a small operator. My product has a "reported" market of from $4 to $6 a pound. But, try to find it.

Today you report a federal man going out buying tungsten from foreign nations for our defense needs. In the current month I have tried to find a market for American-produced tungsten and the divinely perfect bureaucrats of our needy country say: "Go through normal commercial channels, unless you have *large* quantities to sell."

There is the trouble. The small fry must go to some big fry or one of his "agents" and sell to them at *their* price. They are offering $2.50 to $3 for these products—just about cost. When they pass the product on to the consumers—being the federally recognized source—they do as this situation suggests.

Yes, I am for federal regulation. But where is the federal "depository" where we small fry may dispose of our little production and where large or small consumers may get it? This would diminish bureaucratically supported monopolies, which at present are seriously limiting all small operators.

Can you offer us a suggestion?

O. R. D., California

The Blacklist

In your discussion on economic weapons you have mentioned the blacklisting of a number of firms in Latin America trading with fascist countries and seem to praise President Roosevelt for "his courage to blacklist" firms outside of his jurisdiction.

You know very well the very unfavorable reaction caused by such blacklisting in Latin America, where they saw a definite encroachment by President Roosevelt on other nations' business. First of all, the *démarche* should have been diplomatic and not made public with fanfare; second, he should have asked the opinions of the respective governments about the matter.

But what is more important is the fact that American firms are dealing with the fascists and Roosevelt keeps silent on the matter. Before blacklisting firms outside of the U.S., why did he not give the example to the entire hemisphere by blacklisting those American firms—the Standard Oil Company at the head of the list—that trade with Italy, Germany, and Spain? Was he perhaps afraid of the reaction from these powerful corporations at home, and so decided to attack the satellites outside U.S. and let the real guilty ones free to carry on their shady business? Or does he lack courage to point the finger to American fascists in big business? It would be interesting to know why President Roosevelt does not dare expose the American corporations and resorts to the old practice of finding fault somewhere else to keep the true filth covered.

M. G., Kansas

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LISTS

OF 1938–39 TRANSCRIPTS STILL IN PRINT WILL BE SENT UPON REQUEST. STUDENTS AND TEACHERS WILL FIND THESE ISSUES TO BE VALUABLE COMMENTARIES UPON EVENTS OF THE PERIOD.

Nos.

1940

98. *The Jews*
101. *Tariff Walls*
104. *Is America's Economic Frontier Closed?*
105. *Must the World Unite?*
106. *Can We Protect America?*
114. *America and the Peacemongers*
115. *Babies Cost Money*
117. *Have We Time to Think?*
119. *America's Capacity to Arm*
120. *Economic Union for the Americas*
121. *Civil Liberties and the Fifth Column*
128. *Blitzkrieg on Britain*
129. *Should America Aid Britain?*
131. *Can Germany Conquer Latin America?*
132. *Conscript Wealth, Too?*
134. *Will Hitler Attack America Next?*
137. *Warmongers and Appeasers*
140. *World Revolution*
141. *Art and Our Warring World*
142. *The Soviet Union and America*
143. *Is Hitler Revolutionizing Britain?*
144. *Where Are Those 50,000 Planes?*
146. *1951: The Next Decade in Education*

1941

147. *More Aid to Britain Now?*
148. *Is This Our War?*
149. *Morale: First Line of Defense?*
150. *Can Capitalism Defend America?*
152. *Can the Americas Be Invaded?*

Nos.

153. *Guns or Butter?*
154. *Dilemma in the Far East*
155. *How to Fight Nazi Propaganda*
156. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*
157. *Strikes and National Defense*
158. *Defense Economics*
159. *Should We Convoy to Britain?*
160. *Balkan Blitzkrieg*
161. *War Aims and Peace Aims*
162. *Which Road for America?*
163. *Lessons from Europe's War*
164. *The Effect of the Blitzkrieg on the Economic Order*
165. *Defense and America's Health*
166. *Roosevelt* vs. *Hitler*
167. *Polls and the Crisis*
168. *Where's Bunker Hill?*
169. *War against the Middle Classes?*
170. *The Crisis and Your Pocketbook*
171. *America and the German-Soviet War*
172. *Soviet Russia at War*
173. *Our Liberties*
174. *Blueprint for Hemisphere Defense*
175. *Should America Clear the Seas of the Nazis?*
176. *Economic Consequences of a German Victory*
177. *Defense: Who'll Pay the Piper?*
178. *Japan: Setting Sun?*
179. *National Unity*
180. *Weapons of Economic War.* August 24

ALL ROUND TABLE TRANSCRIPTS CONTAIN ADDED FACTUAL MATERIAL IN THE FORM OF GRAPHS, MAPS, PICTOGRAPHS, FOOTNOTES, BIBLIOGRAPHIES, ETC.

ROUND TABLE NETWORK

2:30 P.M. EASTERN DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME

City	Call Letters	Kilocycles	City	Call Letters	Kilocycles
Boston, Mass.	WNAC	1260	Portland, Me.	WCSH	970
Buffalo, N.Y.	WBEN	930	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1180
Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1060	Schenectady, N.Y.	WGY	810
Pittsburgh, Pa.	WCAE	1250			

1:30 P.M. EASTERN STANDARD TIME

Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1340	Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	930
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1400	Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1400
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	750	Lakeland, Fla.	WLAK	1340
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1250	Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1240
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1100	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Columbus, Ohio	WCOL	1230	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1380
Dayton, Ohio	WING	1410	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1340
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	950	Springfield, Ohio	WIZE	1340
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1230	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	970
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1300	Washington, D.C.	WRC	980
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1330	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	600

1:30 P.M. CENTRAL DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME

Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	790
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WGL	1450			

12:30 P.M. CENTRAL STANDARD TIME

Amarillo, Texas	KGNC	1440	Milwaukee, Wis.	WTMJ	620
Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	960	Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minn.	KSTP	1500
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1350
Bristol, Tenn.	WOPI	1490	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	930
Dallas-Fort Worth, Tex.	WBAP	820	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
Des Moines, Iowa	WHO	1040	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1340
El Paso, Texas	KTSM	1380	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1450
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	St. Louis, Mo.	KSD	550
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	San Antonio, Texas	WOAI	1200
Jackson, Miss.	WJDX	1300	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
Kansas City, Mo.	WDAF	610	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
Kingsport, Tenn.	WKPT	1400	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	920	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	970	Wichita, Kans.	KANS	1240
Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1230			

11:30 A.M. MOUNTAIN STANDARD TIME

Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	1030	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1380	Pocatello, Ida.	KSEI	930
Bozeman, Mont.	KRBM	1450	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1320
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1370	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1290
Denver, Colo.	KOA	850	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1270
Helena, Mont.	KPFA	1240			

10:30 A.M. PACIFIC STANDARD TIME

Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	Sacramento, Cal.	KFBK	1530
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1440	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	950
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620	Spokane, Wash.	KHQ	590

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Cincinnati, Ohio WSAI 1360 10:30 P.M. E.S.T.

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Do War and Defense Emergencies Foreshadow the End of the Free Enterprise System?

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SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

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SUGGESTED READINGS

GRATTAN, C. HARLEY, "There'll Be Some Changes Made," *Harper's*, July, 1941.

HARRIMAN, H. I., "What Next for America, in Industry?" *Vital Speeches*, June 15, 1941.

"Memo to Post-War Planners," *Business Week*, June 14, 1941.

[PRINTED IN U.S.A.]